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assessments in line with this epistemic preference contributes to the under‐treatment of pain in at least three
respects, which we detail. Moreover, it may do little to help the practitioner circumvent any intentional
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Across the world, pain is under-treated in emergency departments (EDs).  
We canvass the literature testifying to this problem, the reasons why this 
problem is so important, and then some of the main hypotheses that have 
been advanced in explanation of the problem.  We then argue for the 
plausibility of two new hypotheses: pain’s under-treatment in the ED partly 
owes to (1) an epistemic preference for signs over symptoms on the part of 
some practitioners, and (2) some ED practices that themselves worsen pain 




following logic.  Some ED practitioners depart from formal guidance in 
basing their acute pain assessments on observable features rather than on 
patient reports of pain. This is potentially due to an epistemic preference for 
signs over symptoms which aims to circumvent intentional and/or 
unintentional misrepresentation on the part of patients.  However, 
conducting pain assessments in line with this epistemic preference 
contributes to the under-treatment of pain in at least three respects, which 
we detail.  Moreover, it may do little to help the practitioner circumvent any 
intentional misrepresentation on the part of the patient, as we explain.  
Second, we examine at least four ED practices that may be contributing to 
the under-treatment of pain by increasing patient anxiety and fear, which 
can worsen pain.  These practices include the failure to provide orienting 
information and the partial objectification of patients required to problem-
solve along lines pre-established by modern medical science.  We conclude 




Across the world, pain is under-treated in emergency departments (EDs).  In 
this article, we begin by summarising the literature that testifies to this 
problem and then outline the reasons why this problem is so important.  We 
then canvass some of the main hypotheses that have been advanced in 
explanation of the problem, including the outdated notion that preserving 




on to elaborate in full and whose plausibility we argue for: pain’s under-
treatment in the ED partly owes to (1) an epistemic preference for signs over 
symptoms on the part of some practitioners, and (2) some ED practices that 
themselves worsen pain by increasing patients’ anxiety and fear.  We 
conclude by explaining how basing pain assessment on signs rather than 
symptoms presents several disadvantages, and may do little to help the 
practitioner circumvent any intentional misrepresentation on the part of the 
patient.  We also touch on some potential solutions for ED practice when it 
comes to the problem of increasing patients’ anxiety and fear.  For 
simplicity, we focus on pain that is severe, acute and not post-operative, 




Over the last 25 years, a substantial body of scientific literature has arisen 
testifying to the under-treatment of pain in the ED.  In 1989, Wilson and 
Pendleton coined the term ‘oligoanalgesia’ to characterise the problem of 
analgesia being apparently ‘forgotten’; they found that 56% of studied 
patients received no analgesic medication in the ED despite having been 
admitted ‘with a variety of acutely painful medical and surgical 
conditions’.1  While ED clinicians have expressed doubts about the 
                                                          




persistence and pervasiveness of the problem,2 which ‘is often not felt to be 
present ‘in my ED’’,3 systematic failures to adequately treat pain in EDs 
continue to be observed and studied across countries and sub-populations.4  
In 2007, the first prospective, multi-centre study confirmed earlier 
observations, finding that 
 
pain in the ED continues to be poorly treated.  Our population 
reported high levels of pain intensity, both on ED arrival and at 
discharge, with relatively small changes in pain intensity scores 
during the ED stay.5 
 
                                                          
2 S.M. Green. There Is Oligo-Evidence for Oligoanalgesia. Annals of Emergency Medicine 
2012; 60: 212-214; S.H. Thomas. Management of Pain in the Emergency Department. 
ISRN Emergency Medicine 2013: 19. 
3 D.E. Fosnocht, E.R. Swanson & E.D. Barton. Changing Attitudes About Pain and Pain 
Control in Emergency Medicine. Emerg Med Clin North Am 2005; 23: 297-306: 5. 
4 Ibid.; Thomas, op. cit. note 2; S.H. Johnson. The Social, Professional, and Legal 
Framework for the Problem of Pain Management in Emergency Medicine. J Law Med 
Ethics 2005; 33: 741-760; J. Ducharme. The Future of Pain Management in Emergency 
Medicine. Emerg Med Clin North Am 2005; 23: 467-475; T. Rupp & K.A. Delaney. 
Inadequate Analgesia in Emergency Medicine. Ann Emerg Med 2004; 43: 494-503; R. 
Sinatra. Causes and Consequences of Inadequate Management of Acute Pain. Pain Med 
2010; 11: 1859-1871; M.L. Neighbor, S. Honner & M.A. Kohn. Factors Affecting 
Emergency Department Opioid Administration to Severely Injured Patients. Acad Emerg 
Med 2004; 11: 1290-1296.  
5 K.H. Todd, et al. Pain in the Emergency Department: Results of the Pain and Emergency 




Indeed, Venkat et al. have argued that ‘concerns surrounding ED pain 
management have reached a crisis level that should be considered an ethical 
issue in the profession’ of emergency medicine.6   
 
While much of the literature testifying to pain’s under-treatment in the ED 
has emerged from the United States, the problem is conceivably global.  For 
instance, studies have also emerged from Canada,7 Australia,8 the 
Netherlands,9 Israel,10 Costa Rica,11 the Caribbean,12 and South Africa.13  
                                                          
6 A. Venkat, et al. An Ethical Framework for the Management of Pain in the Emergency 
Department. Acad Emerg Med 2013; 20: 716-723: 716.  For a similar argument not specific 
to the ED, see B.A. Rich. A Legacy of Silence: Bioethics and the Culture of Pain. Journal 
of Medical Humanities 1997; 18: 233-259. 
7 Todd, et al., op. cit. note 5; J. Ducharme & C. Barber. A Prospective Blinded Study on 
Emergency Pain Assessment and Therapy. J Emerg Med 1995; 13: 571-575; Rupp & 
Delaney. 
8 M. Fry, S. Bennetts & S. Huckson. An Australian Audit of ED Pain Management Patterns. 
J Emerg Nurs 2011; 37: 269-274; A. Holdgate, S.A. Shepherd & S. Huckson. Patterns of 
Analgesia for Fractured Neck of Femur in Australian Emergency Departments. Emerg Med 
Australas 2010; 22: 3-8. 
9 S.A. Berben, et al. Pain Prevalence and Pain Relief in Trauma Patients in the Accident & 
Emergency Department. Injury 2008; 39: 578-585. 
10 Z. Zohar, et al. Pain Relief in Major Trauma Patients: An Israeli Perspective. J Trauma 
2001; 51: 767-772. 
11 T.J. Jantos, et al. Analgesic Practice for Acute Orthopedic Trauma Pain in Costa Rican 
Emergency Departments. Ann Emerg Med 1996; 28: 145-150. 
12 C. Macpherson & D. Aarons. Overcoming Barriers to Pain Relief in the Caribbean. 




Indeed, the problem may well be exacerbated in some countries, where 
‘political conflict, social dislocation, and inadequate availability of 
analgesia conspire to make the relief of acute pain sporadic at best’.14 
 
The under-treatment of pain in the ED is a significant medical and ethical 
issue.  Pain is the most common reason why people present to the ED, being 
the primary reason for between 42%15  and 78%16 of patients.  Moreover, 
access to adequate pain management is increasingly conceptualised and 
promoted as a human right.17  The IASP has made a formal declaration, 
asserting the right of all people to have their pain acknowledged, to be 
informed about how their pain can be assessed and managed, and to have 
access, without discrimination, to appropriate pain assessment and 
                                                                                                                                                   
13 R.-M. Jansen. Inadequate Treatment of Pain: Time for the South African Courts to 
Redress This Human Rights Violation? Medicine Law 2010; 29: 497-522. 
14 F. Brennan, D.B. Carr & M. Cousins. Pain Management: A Fundamental Human Right. 
Anesth Analg 2007; 105: 205-221: 206. 
15 M.J. Pletcher, et al. Trends in Opioid Prescribing by Race/Ethnicity for Patients Seeking 
Care in US Emergency Departments. JAMA 2008; 299: 70-78. 
16 P. Tanabe & M. Buschmann. A Prospective Study of ED Pain Management Practices and 
the Patient’s Perspective. J Emerg Nurs 1999; 25: 171-177. 
17 Jansen, op. cit. note 13; Brennan, et al., op. cit. note 14; M.J. Cousins, F. Brennan & D.B. 
Carr. Pain Relief: A Universal Human Right. Pain 2004; 112: 1-4; S.H. Johnson. Relieving 
Unnecessary, Treatable Pain for the Sake of Human Dignity. J Law Med Ethics 2001; 29: 
11-12; D. Lohman, R. Schleifer & J.J. Amon. Access to Pain Treatment as a Human Right. 




management from adequately trained health care professionals.18  There can 
be no doubt that this right is asserted partly in view of the now widely 
acknowledged consequences of under-treating pain.  Under-treated acute 
pain contributes to poorer physical and mental health outcomes and 
increases the risk of chronic pain.19 
 
Pain does not need to be under-treated.  There is rarely any good clinical 
reason for under-treating pain – for example, for deferring or completely 
avoiding the use of pain medication in cases of severe, acute pain.  In 
particular, the use of pain medication need not be deferred for the purpose 
of preserving clinically important symptoms and signs and thereby assisting 
diagnosis.  Fosnocht has observed that to under-treat pain in the service of 
diagnosis reflects outdated thinking.20  Most of the time, there is no need to 
prioritise diagnosis above pain management: therefore, ‘[t]reatment of pain 
should parallel the search for diagnosis of a patient’s underlying condition, 
and has now become the standard of care’.21 
 
Why, then, is pain nonetheless under-treated in the ED?  One answer is that 
Fosnocht’s standard of care is not always met: some practitioners are 
outdated in their thinking, holding onto the view that under-treating pain 
                                                          
18 International Pain Summit of the International Association for the Study of Pain. 
Declaration of Montreal: Declaration That Access to Pain Management Is a Fundamental 
Human Right. J Pain Palliat Care Pharmacother 2011; 25: 29-31. 
19 Sinatra, op. cit. note 4. 
20 Fosnocht, et al., op. cit. note 3. 




assists diagnosis.22 For example, in 2001, Zohar et al. found that ‘The belief 
that pain assists diagnosis was the main reason (78.6%) for withholding 
analgesia’ from major trauma patients in Israeli EDs.23  More recently, Todd 
et al. wondered whether the observed failure to reassess pain intensity after 
ED arrival ‘perhaps mirrors our traditional view of pain as a diagnostic 
indicator rather than an outcome deserving of attention in its own right’.24 
 
Numerous other hypotheses have been advanced concerning pain’s under-
treatment in the ED.  Many have centred on inadequate pain assessment on 
the part of practitioners.  There is clear evidence that ED practitioners 
systematically under-estimate patients’ pain.25  At least three explanations 
have been offered for this under-estimation.  First, practitioners can have an 
outdated understanding of pain, approaching pain as proportional to tissue 
damage and under-appreciating the role of individuating factors, such as a 
patient’s expectations and emotions.26  Second, social distances between 
                                                          
22 Berben, et al.: 584. 
23 Zohar, et al.: 767. 
24 Todd, et al., op. cit. note 5, p. 444. 
25 A.J. Singer, et al. Comparison of Patient and Practitioner Assessments of Pain from 
Commonly Performed Emergency Department Procedures. Ann Emerg Med 1999; 33: 652-
658; L. Marquié, P.C. Sorum & E. Mullet. Emergency Physicians’ Pain Judgments: Cluster 
Analyses on Scenarios of Acute Abdominal Pain. Qual Life Res 2007; 16: 1267-1273; V. 
Guru & I. Dubinsky. The Patient Vs. Caregiver Perception of Acute Pain in the Emergency 
Department. J Emerg Med 2000; 18: 7-12. 
26 D.B. Morris. 1991. The Culture of Pain. Berkeley: University of California Press; E.J. 
Cassel. 2004. The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine. 2nd edn. Cary, NC, USA: 




practitioners and some patient sub-populations (for example, by virtue of 
racial and ethnic differences) can impair pain assessment and 
management.27  Finally, practitioners can suspect patients of drug seeking 
and consequently of fabricating or exaggerating their pain.28  The addictive 
nature of pain medications, especially opiates, has given rise to at least two 
further hypotheses for why pain is under-treated in the ED.  First, 
practitioners can practise defensive medicine, being overly cautious of the 
legal ramifications of providing addictive pain medications.29  Second, 
patients can refuse and fail to request analgesic for fear of iatrogenic 
addiction.30 
 
Pain’s under-treatment in the ED may also partly owe to two types of gaps: 
gaps in the evidence base concerning pain and its treatment, and gaps in the 
medical curriculum.  (The medical curriculum constitutes one central means 
by which to translate an evidence base into practice.  Clinical guidelines 
constitute another.)  For example, gaps in the evidence base have been filled 
when it comes to the true frequency and severity of acute pain episodes 
                                                          
27 C.R. Green, et al. The Unequal Burden of Pain: Confronting Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities in Pain. Pain Med 2003; 4: 277-294; J.H. Tamayo-Sarver, et al. Racial and 
Ethnic Disparities in Emergency Department Analgesic Prescription. Am J Public Health 
2003; 93: 2067-2073. 
28 Johnson, op. cit. note 4. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid.; Tanabe & Buschmann, op. cit. note 16; J.S. Martin & R. Spirig. [Pain Prevalence 
and Patient Preferences Concerning Pain Management in the Emergency Department]. 




related to sickle cell disease.  Practitioners have tended to believe that sickle 
cell pain is ‘the exception rather than the rule’, but evidence now suggests 
that the opposite is true.31  Practitioners seem to have under-estimated the 
frequency of pain episodes because, most of the time, patients have simply 
managed their often-significant pain at home.  And this under-estimation 
may have contributed to practitioners wrongly regarding patients 
frequenting the ED with sickle cell pain as ‘difficult’.32  In short, pain’s 
under-treatment may partly owe to medicine’s limited, still-improving 
understanding of pain and its treatment.  Gaps in the medical curriculum 
have also been highlighted amid calls for change.  For instance, Macpherson 
has observed that, astonishingly, ‘[m]edical curricula and textbooks 
typically omit information on how to relieve or prevent pain’.33  In view of 
this, she has argued that ‘[p]ain management should be introduced in 
preclinical curricula and reinforced during clinical education in both rich 
and poor nations’.34  Others have taken care to add that practitioners ought 
to be vested not only with the technical knowledge and skills to reduce pain, 
                                                          
31 W.R. Smith, et al. Daily Assessment of Pain in Adults with Sickle Cell Disease. Ann 
Intern Med 2008; 148: 94-101. 
32 E.J. Bergman & N.J. Diamond. Sickle Cell Disease and the ‘Difficult Patient’ 
Conundrum. Am J Bioeth 2013; 13: 3-10. 
33 C. Macpherson. Undertreating Pain Violates Ethical Principles. J Med Ethics 2009; 35: 
603-606. 




but also with the understanding that pain is not merely symptomatic of, and 
of secondary importance next to, some more objective medical condition.35 
 
Despite the fact that a range of hypotheses have been advanced for why pain 
is under-treated in the ED, Johnson has argued that disappointing results 
from interventions designed to improve ED pain management suggest that 
‘the reasons and root causes … are still not well understood’.36 
 
There are at least two further possible reasons why pain is under-treated in 
the ED.  These two reasons may underlie others, particularly helping to 
explain why ED practitioners systematically under-estimate patients’ pain 
levels.  The two reasons are worthy of investigation in their own right, but 
they may also help to explain why other reasons have yet to be acted on in 
ways that substantially improve pain management in the ED. 
 
First, an epistemic preference for signs over symptoms on the part of some 
practitioners may result in delays in the use of pain medication, in the 
systematic under-estimation of patients’ pain, and in patient perceptions of 
distrust on the part of their practitioners.  These perceptions of distrust lead 
onto the second further possible reason why pain is under-treated in the ED.  
ED practices may themselves worsen patients’ pain by increasing patients’ 
                                                          
35 D. Resnik & M. Rehm. The Undertreatment of Pain: Scientific, Clinical, Cultural, and 
Philosophical Factors. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 2001; 4: 277-288; W. 
Ruddick. Do Doctors Undertreat Pain? Bioethics 1997; 11: 246-255. 
36 Johnson, op. cit. note 4, p. 743. For a list of hypotheses not specific to the ED, see Resnik 




anxiety and fear.  Practitioners may not be sufficiently aware that anxiety 
and fear worsen pain, and that patients’ anxiety and fear can be increased by 
practitioners appearing to distrust patients, withholding information that 
could otherwise help to orient patients, and objectifying patients under what 




1. An epistemic preference for signs over symptoms 
 
Internationally endorsed clinical guidelines advise practitioners to base their 
acute pain assessments on the patient’s report, for the reason that pain is 
highly individual and therefore cannot be inferred solely from the 
mechanism of injury, the extent of tissue damage, or any other observable 
feature: 
 
Self-reporting of pain should be used whenever appropriate as pain 
is by definition a subjective experience … There are no objective 
measures of ‘pain’ but associated factors such as hyperalgesia (eg 
mechanical withdrawal threshold), the stress response (eg plasma 
cortisol concentrations), behavioural responses (eg facial 
expression), functional impairment (eg coughing, ambulation) or 
                                                          









However, there is evidence that some ED practitioners do not base their 
acute pain assessments on the patient’s report, assigning more importance to 
features that they can directly observe.  Marquié, Sorum and Mullet found 
that ED clinicians ‘appeared to act, in rating patients’ pain, as if they were 
readjusting each patient’s rating in response to its degree of ‘discordance’ 
with the other information’.39  That is, if a patient reported severe pain but 
demonstrated less-than-expected pain behaviour, for example, then the ED 
clinician seemed to revise down the patient’s pain rating in proportion to the 
difference; the greater the difference, the more the ED clinician revised 
down the patient’s own pain rating.  Similarly, Bijur et al. found that ED 
practitioners ‘do not use patients’ self-reported pain as the major indication 
for use of opioid analgesics’.40  Instead, ED practitioners seemed to attach 
                                                          
38 P.E. Macintyre, et al. 2010. Acute Pain Management: Scientific Evidence. 3rd edn. 
Melbourne: Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists and Faculty of Pain 
Medicine: xx, 37.  This document is promoted as ‘the foremost English-language resource 
of its type worldwide’ (Ibid.: iii).  It is recommended by the American Academy of Pain 
Medicine and endorsed by the IASP and professional colleges in the UK, Ireland, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Hong Kong. 
39 Marquié, et al., op. cit. note 25, p. 1270. 
40 P.E. Bijur, et al. Lack of Influence of Patient Self-Report of Pain Intensity on 





more weight to observable features, such as the mechanism of injury, for 
patients with fractures were ‘more likely to receive opioids than patients 
with comparable degrees of pain but without fractures’.41 
 
Evidence that, contrary to formal guidance, at least some ED practitioners 
do not base their acute pain assessments on the patient’s report can 
potentially be explained by an epistemic preference for signs over 
symptoms.  That is, some ED practitioners may put greater epistemic store 
in signs than in symptoms, seeing signs as objective but symptoms as 
subjective and, therefore, of lesser import.  To understand this, it is helpful 
to briefly explicate the symptom-sign distinction as it is typically applied. 
 
Symptoms are experienced then reported by the patient to a practitioner, 
who records them as part of a history.  By contrast, signs are obtained via 
observation on the part of a practitioner, with observation taking the form of 
a clinical examination or diagnostic test.  Along these lines, pain is a 
symptom, but tenderness is a sign, for it is elicited by the practitioner during 
clinical examination.  There are signs (for instance, a palpable mass) void of 
corresponding symptoms, and vice versa (for instance, a headache).  Both 
symptoms and signs require interpretation.  But conceivably more 
interpretation is required in the case of symptoms, insofar as the practitioner 
must sometimes translate what the patient says into terms tractable to 
current medical knowledge, while signs are already elicited in these terms.  
Furthermore, symptoms can be unintentionally misrepresented.  For 





instance, the patient can describe them imprecisely or remember them 
incorrectly.  Symptoms can also be intentionally misrepresented: they can 
be fabricated, exaggerated or hidden by the patient, whereas signs typically 
cannot.  Tenderness is atypical here: with effort on the part of the patient, 
tenderness can be fabricated, exaggerated or hidden, so a practitioner may 
opt to distract the patient as a means of shoring up confidence that the 
tenderness elicited is not being intentionally misrepresented – that it is 
serving as a typical sign. 
 
In the case of acute pain management in the ED, the practitioner may, for 
example, begin by basing their pain assessment on the mechanism of the 
medical problem, as indicated by observation, clinical examination and 
diagnostic tests.  The patient history (qua record of symptoms) simply 
serves to guide the clinical examination and diagnostic tests (which produce 
signs).  In undertaking clinical examination, the practitioner specifically 
looks for what a patient cannot misrepresent, such as tenderness elicited 
under distraction, as indicated by involuntary pain behaviour, such as 
physical movements and facial expressions.  Distracting the patient while 
examining them can increase the practitioner’s confidence that the patient’s 
pain behaviour is indeed involuntary and thereby not fabricated, 
exaggerated or hidden.  The practitioner may then adjust their pain 
assessment (up or down) according to the quality and, in particular, 
involuntariness of the patient’s pain behaviour beyond the clinical 




oddities or inconsistencies in the patient’s account, and the pain assessments 
of fellow practitioners.   
 
Alternatively, a practitioner may simply accept the patient’s report of pain 
(qua symptom), having no epistemic preference for signs over symptoms 
that would lead them to do otherwise.  Such a practitioner may, for example, 
then adjust their pain assessment (up or down) only in the event that a very 
different pain level is strongly suggested by one or more signs (such as 
tenderness elicited under distraction) or other pieces of information (such as 
the patient’s pain behaviour outside of the clinical examination proper).  
Even then, the practitioner may only be willing to adjust their pain 
assessment up, in recognition of some patients’ stoicism, and not down, 
refusing to act on a suspicion of drug seeking for fear of denying pain 
medication to someone in pain.  Moreover, the practitioner may be highly 
selective in the signs and other pieces of information that they allow to 
inform their pain assessment.  For instance, a practitioner may disregard 
facial expressions if these could issue from nausea more than pain.  The 
approach outlined in this paragraph seems more in line with clinical 
guidelines than the approach outlined in the previous paragraph. 
 
At least three adverse consequences result from ED practitioners not basing 
their acute pain assessments on the patient’s report out of an epistemic 





First, delays in the use of pain medications occur.  Pain assessment of the 
kind exemplified in the first example often takes an appreciable amount of 
time, and can even be inconclusive. This may result in delays before 
effective pain medication is employed, or even in the complete denial of 
effective pain medication.  Pain medication delays and denials can both 
constitute forms of under-treating pain.   
 
Second, not basing pain assessment on the patient’s report often results in 
pain levels being under-estimated, not over-estimated, as indicated by 
empirical research testifying to practitioners’ systematically under-
estimating pain levels.42  In turn, this under-estimation will lead to under-
treatment, for instance in the form of under-medicating for pain. 
 
Finally, openly conducting pain assessments that focus on observable 
features rather than the patient’s report can result in the patient perceiving 
distrust on the part of the practitioner.  The patient can reason that, in not 
having their pain report accepted at face value, they are distrusted by the 
practitioner.  This perception may be correct, for the practitioner may 
distrust the patient, for instance, suspecting drug seeking.  Alternatively, the 
patient’s perception may be incorrect, for the practitioner may be enacting 
an epistemic preference for signs over symptoms that is devoid of any 
suspicion of patient dishonesty (intentional misrepresentation).  Instead, the 
epistemic preference may rest on a concern to circumvent any unintentional 
                                                          





misrepresentation in the patient’s report of pain.  Whether correct or 
incorrect, the patient’s perception of practitioner distrust is problematic in 
view of its consequences: it can induce or increase patient anxiety and fear, 
which in turn can worsen the patient’s pain.  This leads onto the second 
reason why pain may continue to be under-treated in the ED. 
 
 
2. ED practices themselves worsen pain by increasing patients’ anxiety and 
fear 
 
A second reason for why pain may continue to be undertreated in the ED 
lies in the possibility that ED practices are themselves worsening patients’ 
pain.  Current pain science suggests that anxiety and fear can worsen pain,43 
and some ED practices may themselves be worsening pain by increasing 
patients’ anxiety and fear.  We hypothesise that at least four ED practices 
may be doing this. 
 
First, ongoing pain can itself be cause for anxiety and fear.  In this respect, 
under-treating pain can initiate a vicious cycle, in which pain escalates.  
This is one argument against delaying pain medication, for instance, and we 
explained above how delays follow from a practitioner not basing their 
                                                          
43 Macintyre, et al., op. cit. note 38; D.D. Price. Psychological and Neural Mechanisms of 
the Affective Dimension of Pain. Science 2000; 288: 1769-1772; P.J. Quartana, C.M. 
Campbell & R.R. Edwards. Pain Catastrophizing: A Critical Review. Expert Rev Neurother 




acute pain assessment on the patient’s report out of an epistemic preference 
for signs over symptoms. 
 
Second, we also explained above how the patient can perceive distrust on 
the part of the practitioner when the practitioner does not accept the 
patient’s report of pain at face value, and how this perception can increase 
patient anxiety and fear.  Indeed, there is evidence that, if a practitioner 
suspects that a patient is exaggerating their pain, then the practitioner will 
provide pain medication but its effectiveness will be reduced.44  This is 
conceivably because the practitioner’s distrust is perceived by the patient 
and, being interpreted as something of a threat, results in increased anxiety 
and fear and, in turn, worsened pain. 
 
Third, ED practitioners sometimes do not provide information that could 
otherwise help to prevent or reduce patients’ anxiety and fear.  There is 
evidence that ED practitioners do not provide patients with enough 
information to put them at ease:  
 
The complex, discontinuous and fragmented nature of ED 
consultations can result in loss of knowledge transfer, inadequate 
and confusing explanations and interpersonal insensitivity to the 
patient … Often patients do not have a clear understanding of how 
                                                          
44 J. Miner, et al. Patient and Physician Perceptions as Risk Factors for Oligoanalgesia: A 
Prospective Observational Study of the Relief of Pain in the Emergency Department. Acad 




long a procedure will take, how long an absence will be or what will 
happen to them next. The patient can therefore experience the ED as 
a journey to a foreign land—disorienting, confusing and alienating.45 
 
The withholding of such orienting information, be it intentional or 
unintentional, will often increase patient anxiety and fear.  Take the example 
of an ED patient who receives no effective pain medication because of the 
potential for harmful side effects, but is not told this reason.  Ongoing pain 
can itself be cause for anxiety and fear, but especially so in the absence of 
information as to why the pain is not being treated.  For instance, the 
absence of such orienting information can lead the patient to question how 
much the practitioner does and can care about them, and how far the 
practitioner would and can go for them.  In this way, the unexplained under-
treatment of pain can itself worsen pain by increasing patients’ anxiety and 
fear, again initiating a vicious cycle. 
 
Finally, ED practitioners objectify the patient in a particular way, and this 
can be cause for patient anxiety and fear.  Foucault characterised modern 
medicine in terms of ‘the medical gaze’, which objectifies the patient in 
terms of a complex array of parts and mechanisms.46  Approaching the 
                                                          
45 D. Slade, et al. 2011. Communicating in Hospital Emergency Departments. Final Report 
— Executive Summary. Sydney: Sydney University of Technology: 7, 21. See also R. 
Body, et al. Not All Suffering Is Pain: Sources of Patients’ Suffering in the Emergency 
Department Call for Improvements in Communication from Practitioners. Emerg Med J 
2015; 32: 15-20. 




patient partly as a complex array of parts and mechanisms constitutionally 
risks a split or ‘bifurcation’ between different modes of human engagement: 
one mode is purely ‘curative’, aimed at efficiently correcting damaged parts 
and awry mechanisms, while the other mode is ‘caring’ and compassionate 
in the richer, more traditional senses, focused on the person.47  In other 
words, ‘management’ of the patient – or, more precisely, of the complex 
array of parts and mechanisms with which the patient is partly identified – 
can be distinguished from a ‘care’ that attends more to the whole person of 
the patient and, indeed, draws more on the whole person of the practitioner.  
Bishop et al. have observed this split in the intensive care unit, and 
conceivably it occurs also in the ED.  Other writers have observed of the ED 
‘a culture that supports significant detachment from patients’48 and missed 
opportunities ‘to build rapport and create relationships with patients’.49  
These features may be attributed partly to pressures specific to the ED, but 
also to the broader character of modern medicine, as studied by Foucault. 
 
The objectifying approach described above can enable the practitioner to 
more efficiently problem-solve along lines pre-established by modern 
medical science, especially under time and staffing constraints.  However, it 
can also produce in the practitioner a behaviour and comportment that the 
patient can experience as objectifying and dehumanising, namely as a lack 
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of care, thereby inducing or increasing patient anxiety and fear.  Moreover, 
this experience for the patient can conceivably be intensified by a patient’s 
pain giving rise to a deeply felt need, not only for pain relief, but for 
compassion as a human being who is suffering. 
 
ED patients and practitioners are usually strangers to one another, never 
having been in a therapeutic relation to one another.50  Therefore, their trust 
in one another depends on purely immediate and localised acts.  In this 
respect, ED practice necessarily contrasts with the ideal of primary care.  
ED patients and practitioners have not had the time to build the kind of trust 
that can serve as a ballast against subtle acts and omissions which might be 
cause for distrust, and thereby for anxiety and fear for the patient.  In this 
respect, the ED encounter is a comparatively fragile thing, and ED patients 
are especially vulnerable. 
 
If, as we have argued, ED practices can themselves worsen pain by 
increasing patient anxiety and fear, then the use of pain to monitor both a 
patient’s condition and the effectiveness of their pain management is 
problematic.  In other words, the pain story gets so complicated that it is 
hard to use it clinically.  This is because pain severity can track, not only the 
patient’s condition and pain management, but also how the patient is 
responding to the ED and its practitioners.  This problem is exacerbated if, 
due to particular ED practices, the patient feels more pain but nonetheless 
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shows less.  Early research on how perceiving a ‘social threat’ influences a 
person’s pain and associated facial expressions suggests that this may occur 
in some situations.51  A social threat turns on how one is treated by others 
or, more precisely, on what others will seemingly allow one to suffer.  If 
particular ED practices can result in a patient ‘feeling more pain but 
showing less’,52 then it is not surprising that practitioners often observe 
inconsistencies between the patient’s pain report, pain behaviour and 
clinical signs. As discussed earlier, these observed inconsistencies result in 





We have argued that there may be at least two hitherto-unexamined reasons 
why pain continues to be under-treated in the ED.  First, an epistemic 
preference for signs over symptoms on the part of some practitioners may 
be resulting in delays in the use of pain medication, in the under-estimation 
of pain levels, and in patient perceptions of practitioner distrust which can 
themselves worsen pain by way of increasing patients’ anxiety and fear.  
Second, a number of ED practices may be worsening patient’s pain by 
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increasing patients’ anxiety and fear.  In principle, these practices can be 
changed for the better, or at least tempered in their adverse effects. 
 
First, there is usually no good clinical reason for delaying or denying 
effective pain medication.  By contrast, there are good reasons for the ED 
practitioner to base their acute pain assessment on the patient’s report, in 
line with formal guidance.  Basing pain assessment on signs rather than 
symptoms presents several disadvantages, as touched on above, and no 
persuasive advantages.  For instance, it may do little to help the practitioner 
circumvent any intentional misrepresentation on the part of the patient.  
While drug seeking is fairly common in the ED, accounting for one fifth of 
all ED visits,54 patient deception is very difficult to detect: one review found 
that practitioners correctly identified actors only 10% of the time, with some 
patients being mistaken as actors.55  Moreover, a practitioner may do well to 
trust patients as a matter of principle,56 and may refuse to risk delaying or 
denying pain medication for a patient in pain, reasoning that the wrong of 
this delay or denial outweighs the harm of feeding an addiction. 
 
                                                          
54 Zechnich and Hedges estimated that while only 2.4% of ED and urgent care patients 
were drug seekers, this small proportion of patients accounted for 20% of all visits (2.4% = 
30/1259, while 20% = 379/1889 ).  A.D. Zechnich & J.R. Hedges. Community-Wide 
Emergency Department Visits by Patients Suspected of Drug-Seeking Behavior. Acad 
Emerg Med 1996; 3: 312-317: 314. 
55 B. Jung & M.M. Reidenberg. Physicians Being Deceived. Pain Med 2007; 8: 433-437. 





There is rarely any justification for withholding orienting information from 
the patient.  Such explanations as may be offered tend to focus on time and 
staffing shortages, and these are matters which require remedial action at a 
hospital or government level.  By contrast, ED practitioners are commonly 
justified in partially objectifying the patient to better problem-solve along 
lines pre-established by modern medical science.  Indeed, this practice 
seems endemic to the whole of modern medicine.  However, in principle, 
the adverse effects of this practice, being a potential source of patient 
anxiety and fear, can be ameliorated.  For instance, a practitioner can take 
care to knowingly and openly oscillate between contrasting modes of human 
engagement, one ‘caring’, the other more narrowly ‘curative’.57  
Alternatively, a practitioner can seek to exhibit the first mode of 
engagement while conforming to the second in their underlying thought 
processes, though questions clearly follow as to how successfully they will 
be able to do this and whether they ethically ought to wear such a mask. 
 
We hope to at least provide ED practitioners, in particular, with 
argumentation that can enhance their reflective understanding of their 
practice and therein their capacity to share this understanding with their 
patients.  If our argumentation is sound, then sharing such orienting 
information may help to remove at least one potential cause of pain’s under-
treatment in the ED. 
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